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von Lehe: Milk Price Fixing in South Carolina

NOTES
MILK PRICE FIXING IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I. Introdut tion
The following quotations from the neighboring states of
Mississippi and Georgia point to the underlying arguments for
and against fixing the price of milk-whether it is a necessary
and constitutional objective or whether it is in violation of clue
process of law.
Contrast:
/

The police powers of the State may be exercised in the
proper control and regulation of an industry affecting the
public interest, even to the extent of fixing prices for the
milk in all stages and forms, and the legislature of the State
has solemnly invoked those powers for the control and
regulation of the milk industry, even to the fixing of such
prices.'
With:
If this court, in deference to the economic advantages which
some may derive from this legislation, should shrink from
the performance of its duty and fail to declare this assault
upon individual liberty unconstitutional because the legislature has recited that milk is an important and essential
food, a precedent would thereby be set requiring this court
to sustain legislation fixing the price of all products vital
to human life and health ....

By such conduct the legisla-

ture, aided and abetted by the judiciary of this State, could
ultimately convert Georgia into a socialistic state despite
the plain provisions of the Constitution which forbid such. 2
The question has been laid to rest on the national level, by
having been held a valid federal constitutional action, 3 but it is
still very much alive in South Carolina. In the very recent case
1. Mississippi Milk Comnm'n v. Vance, 240 Miss. 814, 860, 129 So. 2d. 642,

662 (1961).

2. Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 570, 67 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1951)
curring opinion).
3. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).

(con-

389
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of Riohbourg's Shoppers Fair,Inc. v. Stone4 the South Carolina
Supreme Court followed its prior decisions 5 and held a 1965 price
fixing statute unconstitutional. This act,6 though more of an
anti-discrimination law, was also vulnerable to the due process
argument for it, like its predecessors, placed restrictions on the
use of property. However, milk price fixing still continues as
established under the 1966 price control statute." (This act,
called the "Emergency Milk Control Law of 1966," was to last
only 380 days but has been extended until June 1, 1968, by
recent legislation.8 ) But as a consequence of the Shoppers Fair
decision, the constitutionality of the present act is dubious.
II. Gwynette V. Myers
On April 27, 1953, the legislature created the State Dairy
Commission for the purpose of regulating the quality of milk
brought into South Carolina.9 Section 32-1610.26 of the 1952
Code made it clear that the commission was not to fix prices.
But in 1955 this section was repealed by act number 496,10 which
gave the commission power to declare a state of emergency and
fix minimum prices at the producer, distributor and retail levels.
The constitutionality of the 1955 act, insofar as it applied to
retail grocers, was challenged in the 1960 case of Gwynette V.
Myers." There the Dairy Commission had prevented a retail
grocer from using milk as a "loss-leader." (The practice is to
sell one product at a loss in order to attract customers.) Justice
Legge for the three-to-two majority said that there was no
emergency, and, even if there had been, the law was still a violation of the due process clause of the South Carolina Constitution. 112 The argument is that one may not be deprived of ownership in his property without due process of law. Since the
right to ownership consists of the right to use his property, price
fixing is depriving him of this ownership.
4. 153 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1967).
5. Stone v. Salley, 244 S.C. 531, 137 S.E2d 788 (1964); Gwynette v.
Myers, 237 S.C. 17, 115 S.E.2d 673 (1960).
6. LIV S.C. Stats. at Large 528 (No. 297, 1965).
7. LIV S.C. Stats. at Large 2847 (No. 1165, 1966).
8. Ratification No. 59, signed into law Feb. 20, 1967.
9. XLVIII S.C. Stats. at Large 279 (No. 230, 1953).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1634 to -1634.68 (1962).
11. 237 S.C. 17, 115 S.E.2d 673 (1960).
12. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
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A state through its police power may deprive a person of
property rights, but in order to do so the property must be
affected with a public interest. This has been the test since the
1877 United States Supreme Court decision of Munn v. Illinois."3
The South Carolina court in attempting to apply this test noted
that the test is not susceptible to precise definition. It agreed
with a 1929 United States Supreme Court opinion 14 which held
that the phrase means devoted to a public use, or in other words
its use is granted to the public, and that simply because the
public is warranted in having a feeling of concern over its
maintenance is not enough. In dictum the South Carolina court
in Gwynette made two observations: (1) That although milk is
essential and perishable, similar characteristics are present in
other industries of great importance to this state, e.g., the marketing of meat and fruit, or the sale of fish. The court seemed
to be asking what made milk unique. And, (2) the court found
no suggestion that any producer or distributor has yet been
forced to reduce his price as a result of the defendant's lossleader practice.
III. The Due Process Argument in Other Jurisdictions
The vast majority of state courts that have considered milk
price control acts have found them constitutional.1 5 They have
so decided following the 1934 landmark federal case of Nebbia
v. New York. 6 There the Supreme Court upheld a New York
statute that fixed the retail price of milk. The court found the
milk industry to be affected with a public interest and that the
13. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
14. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).

15. Franklin v. State, 232 Ala. 637, 169 So. 295 (1936); Jersey Maid Milk

Prods. Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939); Shriver v. Lee, 81
Fla. 805, 89 So. 2d 318 (1956) ; Milk Control Bd. v. Crescent Creamery, 214

Ind. 240, 14 N.E.2d 588 (1938); Milk Control Bd. v. Gosselin's Dairy, 310

Mass. 174, 16 N.E2d 641 (1938); Mississippi Milk Comm'n v. Vance, 240
Miss. 814, 129 So. 2d 642 (1961); Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d
735 (Mo. 1962); Montana Milk Control Bd. v. Rehberg, 141 Mont. 149,
376 P.2d 508 (1962); Cloutier v. State Milk Control Bd., 92 N.H. 199, 28
A.2d 554 (1942); Abbott's Dairies v. Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319, 102 A.2d 372
(1954) ; Noyes v. Erie & Wyo. Farmer's Co-op., 281 N.Y. 187, 22 N.E.2d 334
(1939) ; State ex rel Van Winkle v. Farmer's Union Co-op. Creamery, 160
Ore. 205, 84 P.2d 471 (1938) ; Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 186
Atl. 336 (1936) ; State v. Auclair, 110 Vt 147, 4 A.2d 107 (1939); Board of
Supervisors v. Milk Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35 (1950); State ex rel

Finnegan v. Lincoln Dairy, 221 Wis. 1, 265 N.W. 197 (1936).
16. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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phrase meant only that the industry, for adequate reason, is
subject to control for the public good. The decision, though of
course not binding on state court interpretation of state constitutions, carried vehement persuasive force.
In Mississippi, as though expecting a court fight, the legislature put many of the favorite arguments for milk price fixing
in the preamble of their act. 17 When the litigation came in
Mississippi Milk C'ommission v. Vance'8 the court unanimously
followed a separation of powers approach and gave much weight
to the legislature's findings. The opinion is extensive but its
basic rationale is that the legislature primarily should be the
judge of the necessity for such an enactment. 19
Just two years after Nebbia the Alabama court decided that
their law2 0-a virtual copy of the New York Act-was constitutional and that there could be no serious doubt that the business of producing and selling milk was affected with the public
interest.2 1 In this they followed Nebbia to the letter.22 There
was one dissenter who also objected to the idea of emergency
23
legislation designed to permanently control milk collection.
In Reynolds v. Milk Commission,2 4 a six-judge Virginia court

on November 15, 1934, held unconstitutional a law25 fixing a
minimum price at which producers could sell milk. The due
process clause of the Virginia constitution 8 was adopted in
1902. The court, noting that it was taken from the Federal Constitution, applied the construction placed on the Federal Constitution by the Supreme Court up until that time.27 It discussed, but refused to follow the then seven months old Nebbia
decision. 28 Two justices, in dissenting, felt that the milk industry
was affected with a public interest. 29 But on March 29, 1935, a
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Miss. Laws 1960, ch. 155.
240 Miss. 814, 129 So. 2d 642 (1961).
Id. at 858, 129 So. 2d at 663.
Ala. Gen. Acts (1935) No. 204.
Franklin v. State, 169 So. 295 (Ala. 1936).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 303.
163 Va. 957, 177 S.E. 44 (1934).
Va. Acts (1934) No. 357.
VA. CoNsT. art. 1,

§ 11.

Reynolds v. Milk Comm'n, 177 S.E. 44, 49 (Va. 1934).

28. Id. at 50.

29. Id. at 58.
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full bench reheard the November decision and overruled ita °
The dissenting opinion became the majority opinion, and milk
price fixing was held constitutional at the producer level. In
a 1959 case8 ' the Virginia court found it unnecessary to comment on the due process argument but simply made reference to
Reynolds and to the United States Supreme Court decision of
Highand Farms Dairy v. Agnew3 2 in which the same Virginia
statute was considered. In Highland Farms, Justice Cardozo
stated that the act did not violate the Federal Constitution 3 by
fixing minimum prices at producer, distributor and retailer
levels, and whether it violated the Virginia constitution was up
to the Virginia courts.3 4
In 1936 the Florida Supreme Court held an emergency milk
price control statute 5 constitutional as it applied to a distributor. 6 The court notably refused to comment on the validity
of permanent legislation. The court accepted the Nebbia definition of "affected with a public interest" as being subject
to regulation in the public interest.3 7 The court stated that if
the legislature found that there was such an economic emergency
in which the dairy industry was threatened, then, in the absence
of proof by the appellant to the contrary, these findings of fact
would be conclusive.3 8 Twenty years later the Florida legislature still found the emergency to exist.3 9 This "continuing
emergency" theory was contested by a retailer in Shiver v.
Lee. 40 But the court found no difficulty in reaffirming the
legislature's power to fix wholesale and retail prices. Considering the stated purpose of the legislation, the court said: "We
have never found a stronger finding of fact and statement of
policy as the basis of regulating and administering a great in30. Reynolds v. Milk Comm'n, 163 Va. 957, 179 S.E. 507 (1935).
31. Board of Supervisors v. State Milk Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35

(1950).

32. 300 U.S. 608 (1937).

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 612.
Id. at 613.
Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 17103.
Miami Home Milk Producer's Ass'n v. Milk Control Bd., 169 So. 541

(Fla. 1936).

37. Id. at 547.
38. Id. at 542.
39. Fla. Laws 1953, cA. 501.
40. 89 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1956).
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dustry .... " 41 They followed Nebb7a's more liberal test of what
is affected with a public interest and said:
[T]here is certainly nothing in this case to indicate that the
police power was invoked for private purposes or for other
than a proper legislative purpose.... [T]he power to reasonably regulate the price of a commodity does not necessarily
depend on the existence of an economic emergency but may
in a proper case be exercised because of the peculiar nature
42
of the problems incident to marketing the commodity.

There was one dissenter without opinion.
Besides South Carolina, in only one state, Georgia, has a terminal court held milk price fixing unconstitutional. The decisions of the Georgia court show a reversal of trends; the price
law was held constitutional in two earlier decisions43 but was
44
later emphatically denounced as a violation of due process.

The first decision was Bohannon v. DuncanA5 in 1938. The case
came up on a demurrer; therefore the court accepted the uncontested legislative declaration that an emergency existed.4 6 The
opinion, though brief, contains a synopsis of the gainweights
most frequently used in determining such an act constitutional:
the separation of powers approach in presuming the act constitutional, the acceptance of the legislature's uncontradicted
determination of facts and the acceptance of the Nebbia definition of "affected with a public interest" as meaning subject to
the police power. One justice dissented and one was disquali47
fied.
The constitutionality of the Georgia act 4 s was again affirmed
49
about a year later in Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers.
The court pointed out that the act does not become effective in
a marketing area until a majority of the producers and distrib41. Id. at 321.

42. Id. at 322.
43. These were Bohannon v. Duncan, 185 Ga. 840, 196 S.E. 897 (1938) and
Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producer's Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 3 S.E2d

705 (1939).
44. Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E.2d 692 (1951).
45. 185 Ga. 840, 196 S.E. 897 (1938).
46. Id. at 841, 196 S.E.2d at 898.

47. Id.
48. Ga. Laws (1937) No. 247.
49. 188 Ga, 358, 3 S.E.2d 705 (1939).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss3/11

6

19671

von Lehe: Milk Price Fixing in South Carolina

NoT s

utors of that area vote affirmatively to have the law apply
there. 50 In other words, there was some choice available. The
extended emergency parody gave the court little trouble. They
said:
It is true that they have predicated it on a so-called emergency, and have determined that it may be of at least five
years' duration. We cannot say, from anything of which
we may take judicial notice, that conditions appropriate for
such public regulations did not or do not exist; nor may we
assume if these conditions said by the General Assembly
to exist should be cured or cease to exist, that the Assembly
will not itself so determine and appeal this remedy chosen
by it.51
52
Two justices dissented relying on the due process clause.

Although price fixing at producer-distributor levels is still in
force in Georgia, 53 the constitutionality of the present act is of
considerable doubt, 54 because of the 1951 case of HarrisV. Duncan.55 There a unanimous court held the milk industry not to
be affected with a public interest.5 6 It said that since Bohannon
and Holcombe were not full-bench decisions, they were not binding on them. 57 The court, though faced with every decision in
the United States against it plus two in its own jurisdiction,
tenaciously held with the Nebbia dissent that the milk industry
is essentially private in nature.58
Milk price regulations of some type or another are almost
uniform. Only Alaska and Hawaii have none. Sixteen states
fix exact prices at either producer, distributor or retail levels
and twelve others prevent either their wholesalers or retailers,
or both, from selling at prices below cost. In twenty others the
farmer alone gets a guaranteed price. These twenty are governed only by federal marketing orders.59
50. Id. at 360, 3 S.E2d at 707.
51. Id. at 372, 3 S.E.2d at 713.
52. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
53. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-554 (1957).

54. See editorial note following GA.

CODE

ANN. § 42-554 (Supp. 1966).

55. 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E2d 692 (1951).

56. Id. at 563, 67 S.E2d at 694.
57. Id. at 563, 67 S.E.2d at 693.
58. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)

(dissenting opinion at 554).

59. Bowles, Price Regulations on Milk are Wide Spread, News and Courier,

(Charleston, S. C.) Feb. 15, 1967, p. 1.
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IV. FederaZ Regulation
A federal marketing order is a price fixing regulation issued
by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended. 0 The dissenting
opinion of Justice Black in a case construing the complex act is
helpful:
[T]he 1935 Act gave the Secretary specific power to set up
regional marketing areas within which he could, for the government, fix minimum prices handlers [dairies or distributors] would have to pay farmers for the various uses of milk
and require that those minimum prices be paid to a pool for
the area ....
The 1937 reenactment went beyond even this
... to insure that dairy farmers would receive a high enough

price for their products.61
In other words, the act dictates a minimum price that dairies in
a certain area must pay their producers. Application of the act
is predicated upon a condition precedent. Two-thirds of the
producers supplying milk to an area must vote that their distributors be controlled by the order.0 2
The procedure for developing a federal order is as follows:
(1) petition by the dairymen to the Secretary of Agriculture;
(2) investigation by the Secretary to determine if an order
might effectuate the purpose of the act; (3) notification of a
public hearing effectuated by publishing in the Federal Register a press release summary issued by the Department of Agriculture, and by direct mail to the Governor of the State affected
and to any other persons known to be interested; (4) issuance of
a temporary order recommended as a result of the hearing; and
(5) publication of the final order in the Federal Register thirty
days later. This order becomes binding on the dairies after an
affirmative vote by the producers.6 " Since the authority for the
act is the commerce clause, 4 for a market to qualify there must
60. 7 U.S.C. § 608-c (1964).
61. Lehigh Valley Co-op. Farmers v. United States, 370 U.S. 76 (1962)

(dissenting opinion at 101).

62. 7 U.S.C. § 608-c (8)A (1964).
63. ECoNOMIC AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS Div., ECONOmIC RESEARCH SERVICE, USDA, FLUID MILK IN THE UNITED STATES. (Reprinted from Dairy

Situation at 35, May 1965).
64. Id. at 37.
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be interstate implications of the pricing action.6 5 But it was
held in United States v. WYrightwood Dairy Co. 66 that the act
also applies to milk moving in intrastate commerce when these
activities affect interstate commerce. The Court said the act includes "authority to make like regulations for the marketing of
intrastate milk whose sale and competition with the interstate
milk affects its price structure so as in turn to affect adversely
the congressional regulation. 6
The federal orders were given
even more importance with the 1965 decision of Pearce v. Freeman(" in which a Louisiana district court held that federal regulations issued for an area preempted the field and subordinated
similar state controls.
V. The Milk Price War
In April of 1963 Piggly-Wiggly Food Stores in Charleston
cut the price of a half gallon of milk from fifty-five cents to
thirty-nine cents.6 9 The mere skirmishing was ended and a full
scale war began. Within a week milk prices had plummeted all
over South Carolina. The loss-leader competition did not end
for three years and then only through a price fixing law.t 0
Three hundred and eighty-four dairy farmers have gone out
of business since 1963.71 It is a safe inference that many of these
producers were forced out of business as a direct result of the
war.72

In August of 1964 the South Carolina Supreme Court handed
down Stone v. Salley.78 Again a milk price fixing statute74 was
held unconstitutional as it affected retailers. The split-court
opinion, though relying heavily on the Gwynette case, 5 had a
more pragmatic ring to it. Justice Moss said:
65. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
66. 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
67. Id. at 121.
68. 238 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. La. 1965).
69. Bowles, Milk Price War Effects May Help, Hurt Consumer, News and
Courier (Charleston, S. C.) Feb. 18, 1967, p. 1.
70. Id.
71. Interview with South Carolina Dairy Commissioner, in Columbia, S. C.,
Feb. 21, 1967.
72. Id.

73. 244 S.C. 531, 137 S.E.2d 788 (1964).
74. LII S.C. Stats. at Large 512 (No. 319, 1961).
75. Gwynette v. Myers, 237 S.C. 17, 115 S.E2d 673 (1960).
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When the retail dealer purchases milk from the distributor
at the price established by the Commission, and the producer receives from the distributor the price fixed and
required by the milk control act, it is difficult to see how
the interest of either, or of the public at large, can be
prejudiced or threatened by the retail dealer selling at such
a price as he sees fit. The sale of milk by the retail dealer
below the price established by the Commission, where he
has purchased such milk at the price established by the
Commission, cannot adversely affect the producer and disdistributor. It seems to us that the sale of milk at a reduced
price by a retailer, such retailer absorbing the loss, would
therefore be beneficial to the
increase the sale of milk and
76
distributor.
and
producer
Although this statement is purely dictum it is of utmost importance. Its logic was used as a gainweight and should be criticized, for unless retail prices are fixed to curtail loss-leader practices, it would seem that producers and dairies do take a loss,
as will be explained in part VI.
The court held that the statute failed the Munn test because
the milk industry was not affected with a public interest. 77 Two
justices dissented; they observed the undisputed facts found by
the circuit court as to the effects of loss-leader competition and
said:
The sharp difference in the facts which were before the
court in Gwynette and those now presented was assigned by
the circuit judge as one of his reasons for concluding that
Gwynette is not controlling here. The opinion counters by
stating that the well pleaded facts stated in the complaint
in the G'wynette case were "not at material variance with
the evidence submitted in the instant case." But the facts
as deducted by the court in Gwynette unquestionably were
78
different from those now appearing materially different.
In essence, they said there was no price war then, there is one
now, and the private status of the industry has changed into
one in which the public has such an interest as to justify its
76. Stone v. Salley, 244 S.C. 531, 541, 137 S.E.2d 788, 792 (1964).
77. Id.
78. Stone v. Salley, 244 S.C. 531, 549, 137 S.E.2d 788, 796 (1964).
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regulation.7 9 There have been drastic economic changes in the
milk industry since the Cwynette ruling when Justice Legge
wrote that there was no suggestion that producers or distributors had been forced to reduce their price a penny. Perhaps
had Gwynette not been decided before the price war the results
in Salley would have been different. The legislature in its caution to avoid the war may have "cried wolf" prematurely, so
that when the emergency did arise the weight of stare decisis
was already set against them.
VI. The Property Argument
The constitutionality of the extended Emergency Milk Control Law of 196680 empowering the Dairy Commission to fix
retail prices is of considerable doubt.8 1 The Shoppers Fair decision 8 2 certainly reflects this. The circuit court opinion and the
briefs' s presented a new and interesting argument. The constitutional objection to the act 84 in this case was the same-that the
statute denied due process by unduly restricting the retailer's
right to sell his property. However the new argument was that
the milk is not the property of the retailer, that the retailer is
only a consignee, and therefore, since the retailer has no ownership in the milk, his property rights are not violated. 5 Since
the word consignment implies an agency instead of a sale, the
title would remain in the consignor. A consignment creates only
a bailment with authority in the bailee as the consignor's agent
to sell the property to a third person. The court's decision in
Shoppers Fairwas that a consignment existed.86 The judge said:
How can it be said that a producer can deliver to a retailer
a... product which a retailer can cause to become stale and
unwholesome, yet shift the entire loss to the producer who
is powerless to prevent that loss?.
79. Determination of whether an industry had so changed in nature was held
in Gwynette to be a matter for judicial inquiry.
80. Ratification No. 59, signed into law Feb. 20, 1967.
81. See Stone v. Salley, 244 S.C. 531, 137 S.E2d 788 (1964) ; Gwynette v.
Myers, 237 S.C. 17, 115 S.E2d 673 (1960).
82. Richbourg's Shoppers Fair v. Stone, 153 S.E2d 895 (S.C. 1967).
83. Brief of Appellant, Richbourg's Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E2d
895 (S.C. 1967).
84. LIV S.C. Stats. at Large 528 (No. 297, 1965).
85. Brief of Respondents, Richbourg's Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153
S.E2d 895 (S.C. 1967).
86. Record, Richbourg's Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.
1967).
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If the retailer owned all of the milk in his shelves, he
wouldn't price one item in such a manner as to make the
remainder unsaleable. This isn't the policy he follows on
other merchandise in his store which he owns.8 7

But the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed this decision.
Acting Associate Justice Legge agreed with appellant's argument that the transaction between the distributor and the retailer was a "contract for sale or return" and not a consignment.
The distinction is often a difficult one.88 Both sides argued that
milk marketing practices supported their contentions.
Milk marketing practices are uniform throughout the United
States.89 The producer who has built up his herd to supply a
somewhat constant volume of milk must continue extracting this
amount from the cows whether it is sold or not. He cannot
effectively control his supply to meet the highly fluctuating
demand that follows loss-leader retailing. When the cows are
milked, the milk is put up for the distributor, whose trucks move
it to the dairy for processing. At this time the producer is paid
nothing. 0 The distributor then stocks the retail store and receives payment from the retailer. However, every three to four
days the distributor must replace any milk not sold within this
period, at his and the producer's expense. To keep this removed
milk from becoming a total loss, it is converted by the dairy into
milk by-products such as ice cream or powdered milk which
may be stored. The producer receives only approximately onehalf the amount for these dairy products as he receives on fresh
fluid milk sales.
The dairy industry's marketing practices have evolved in
order to insure a supply of wholesome milk. And because of
these established practices, discriminatory trade gimicks such as
loss-leader retailing have a definite detrimental effect.
Normally the producers become very closely interwoven with
the dairy to which they sell, and therefore they have only this
one market. If their dairies' brand of milk is not bought, they
87. Id.
88. 46 Ams. JuR. Sales § 483 (1943).
89. Interview with South Carolina Dairy Commissioner, in Columbia, S. C.,
Feb. 21, 1967.
90. The producer is later paid by the dairy according to his "basis" which
is roughly a volume amount determined by the sale of his milk during the
prior month.
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directly absorb the loss. Although it is theoretically possible for
these producers to contract with another dairy, in reality, this
is not done, partly because of sundry local inspection laws which
would have to be complied with if they changed distributors. In
this context consider again Justice Moss' statement in Salley
that if wholesale prices are set, reduced retail prices might be
beneficial to the producers through increased volume of sale.
This may be true in some other areas but not in the milk industry; milk consumption will remain about the same regardless of
prices. If the retailer cuts the price of brand X, the sales of
brand Y will plummet. The distributor of brand Y will have to
remove more and more of its milk after the four-day period and
convert it into by-products. The producers of this dairy subsequently take the loss. If the retailers would, without discriminating, uniformly cut the prices of all brands, perhaps this practice would not be damaging.
VII. Conlusion
Presently, under recent emergency legislation, South Carolina
has milk price fixing at all three levels. This legislation will
remain in force until challenged, and whether or not it will be
challenged may have been determined by the decision in the
Shoppers Fair case. There the South Carolina Supreme Court
followed its prior decisions of Gwynette and Saley, and again
held milk price fixing unconstitutional. The court has considered the arguments from other jurisdictions concerning the same
issues and it has cited the same precedent cases used by the other
courts. Although the court's decisions have been contrary to the
weight of authority, it has not been oblivious to the pertinent
issues. It should also be pointed out that if state legislation is
not permitted in this area, there lurks the possibility that federal controls may preempt the field. The fate of milk price
fixing in South Carolina in undecided, but the guidelines for
coming decisions are set.
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